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An important cornerstone in the control of antimicro-
bial resistance (AMR) is a well-designed quantitative 
system for the surveillance of spread and temporal 
trends in AMR. Since 2008, the Dutch national AMR 
surveillance system, based on routine data from medi-
cal microbiological laboratories (MMLs), has devel-
oped into a successful tool to support the control of 
AMR in the Netherlands. It provides background infor-
mation for policy making in public health and health-
care services, supports development of empirical 
antibiotic therapy guidelines and facilitates in-depth 
research. In addition, participation of the MMLs in the 
national AMR surveillance network has contributed 
to sharing of knowledge and quality improvement. A 
future improvement will be the implementation of a 
new semantic standard together with standardised 
data transfer, which will reduce errors in data handling 
and enable a more real-time surveillance. Furthermore, 
the scientific impact and the possibility of detect-
ing outbreaks may be amplified by merging the AMR 
surveillance database with databases from selected 
pathogen-based surveillance programmes containing 
patient data and genotypic typing data.
Introduction
The number of infections caused by bacteria that are 
resistant to commonly used antimicrobials is increas-
ing worldwide [1]. On World Health Day 2011, the 
Director-General of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) warned that the world was headed towards a 
post-antibiotic era [2], which she later called “the end 
of modern medicine as we know it” [3]. In 2013, the 
Chief Medical Officer of the United Kingdom (UK) even 
used the words “apocalyptic threat” [4].
To address this threat, an independent review commit-
tee was set up in the UK in 2014 to analyse the global 
problem and propose concrete actions for an interna-
tional approach [5], and in 2015, the WHO prepared 
a global action plan [6]. In both reports, surveillance 
of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) was mentioned as 
a cornerstone in the control of AMR, but it was also 
stated that in many countries AMR surveillance was 
not yet in place or under-resourced. Therefore, several 
projects were set up in the past few years to increase 
resources for national and international AMR surveil-
lance. Examples of these are the Central Asian and 
Eastern European Surveillance of AMR (CAESAR) [7] 
and the Global AMR Surveillance System (GLASS) [8], 
both developed by the WHO.
Although a good national AMR surveillance is absent 
in many countries, in others a well-functioning 
national AMR surveillance system is in place [1]. In the 
Netherlands, a well-functioning national AMR surveil-
lance system has been in place since 2008. The goal 
of this paper is to give a comprehensive overview of 
this system. We describe the methodology, the output 
and the utilisation of the data, including methodologi-
cal issues and future developments of the system. We 
believe that the knowledge gained from this and other 
systems will be useful for countries who are setting up 
AMR surveillance or improving an existing AMR surveil-
lance system.
The Dutch national antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance network
The Dutch national AMR surveillance system, called the 
‘Infectious Diseases Surveillance Information System 
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for Antimicrobial Resistance’ (ISIS-AR), was set up in 
2008 [9-11] and designed in close collaboration with 
the Dutch Society for Medical Microbiology (NVMM). It 
is based on data from routine antimicrobial suscepti-
bility testing (AST) in the Dutch medical microbiology 
laboratories (MMLs) and is maintained by the Centre 
for Infectious Disease Control (CIb) of the National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). 
The main objectives are to monitor the magnitude and 
trends of AMR as well as outbreaks involving AMR. The 
data can be used to retrospectively identify or prospec-
tively monitor the emergence of new AMR mechanisms 
based on their phenotypic expression. By providing 
data to support policy making in public health and 
healthcare, in particular the development of empiric 
antibiotic treatment guidelines, and to facilitate scien-
tific research, the system contributes to quality, safety 
and reduction of healthcare costs.
Participation of MMLs in the national AMR surveillance 
system is on a voluntary basis. Starting with eight 
participating MMLs in 2008, the system had grown by 
May 2017 into a network of 42 of 57 MMLs, distributed 
across the country (Figure 1A). Four of these MMLs 
exclusively serve a university hospital, two exclusively 
serve general practitioner (GP) practices, obstetrician 
practices, long-term care facilities and public health 
facilities, and 36 serve both general hospitals and 
GP practices. In addition, 13 MMLs are in the process 
of connecting to the national AMR surveillance sys-
tem and the remaining two are due in the near future 
(Figure 1A).  Figure 1B  shows the regions covered by 
the participating MMLs in 2016 as the percentage of 
inhabitants, by 4-digit postal code area, for whom data 
on at least one isolate had been sent to the national 
AMR surveillance system in 2016. 
Sampling habits and microbiological testing 
in the Netherlands
Because the Dutch national AMR surveillance system 
is entirely based on routine AST, it heavily depends on 
sampling policies and microbiological testing methods 
Figure 1
Geographical distribution of medical microbiology laboratories, the Netherlands, May 2017 (n = 57)
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used in the Dutch healthcare system. Because in the 
Netherlands, most healthcare costs, including micro-
biological cultures, are covered by a mandatory health 
insurance scheme, sampling habits were until recently 
not under financial constraints. However, recent poli-
cies aimed at reducing healthcare costs that require 
patients to pay the first EUR 385 themselves, may 
cause patients to refuse diagnostics being done. To 
which extent these policies lead to bias in the surveil-
lance data remains to be studied.
In hospitals, specimens for microbiological cultures are 
sampled for several indications: (i) diagnostic samples 
are usually collected from all patients presenting with 
signs of clinical infection, (ii) active surveillance sam-
ples are routinely collected from patients who have a 
high risk of developing infections with highly resistant 
microorganisms (HRMOs), and from patients undergo-
ing selective gut or oropharyngeal decontamination 
(SDD/SOD), and (iii) screening samples are collected 
upon admission from patients who are at high risk of 
carrying an HRMO (e.g. patients transferred from a hos-
pital in a foreign country or patients working in animal 
husbandry) and, if necessary, patients, family and/
or personnel who had contact with a person known 
to be carrying an HRMO [12]. At GP practices and in 
nursing homes, sampling policy is more restrictive: 
microbiological samples are usually only collected 
after one or more empiric treatment failures or recur-
rent infection.
The majority of AST for most Gram-negative 
bacteria and for three Gram-positive bacte-
ria  Staphylococcus  spp.,  Enterococcus  spp., and 
sometimes  Streptococcus  spp. are performed using 
automated systems such as VITEK2 (BioMérieux, 
Marcy l’Etoile, France), Phoenix (Becton, Dickinson and 
Company, Franklin Lakes, New Jersey, United States 
(US)) or Microscan (Beckman Coulter, Brea, California, 
US). AST for other Gram-positive pathogens is mostly 
performed using disk diffusion or gradient tests. 
Between 2011 and 2013, most Dutch MMLs adapted 
their AST standards to match the guidelines devel-
oped by the European Committee on AST (EUCAST 
[13]). Previously, laboratories used various standards, 
predominantly those from the Clinical and Laboratory 
Standards Institute (CLSI [14]). HRMOs are confirmed 
according to laboratory detection standards of the 
NVMM [15]. All laboratories are involved in at least one 
national or international quality scheme for suscepti-
bility testing.
Figure 2
Data flow of the Dutch national antimicrobial resistance surveillance system
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Collection of data 
Figure 2  shows the data flow of the national AMR 
surveillance system. Participating MMLs are asked to 
provide data on all positive cultures for which antibiotic 
susceptibility has been determined. 
Each month, AST test results of the previous month are 
extracted from the laboratory information management 
system (LIMS) in a fixed data format. The dataset con-
tains anonymised data on all successive isolates per 
patient, with a patient identifier, codes for the speci-
men, the species identified and, for each tested agent, 
the susceptible/intermediate/resistant (S/I/R) interpre-
tations as well as the crude minimum inhibitory con-
centrations (MIC) and zone diameters, if available. For 
each isolate, epidemiological data about the patient 
are collected, including year and month of birth, sex, 
healthcare setting (GP, nursing home, outpatient clinic, 
inpatient clinic), the indication for sampling (diagnos-
tic, active surveillance, screening) and, for hospital-
ised patients, the date of admission, the hospital ward 
(e.g. intensive care unit) and the medical specialty of 
the physician requesting the diagnostics.
The multidisciplinary team at the RIVM that handles 
incoming data consists of data managers, epidemi-
ologists and medical microbiologists. Before a file of 
incoming data is included in the surveillance database, 
the data have to be translated to standardised codes 
because different laboratories use different codes. The 
development and maintenance of the necessary MML-
specific translation tables requires intensive alignment 
between surveillance team and MML, especially before 
the initial connection of an MML to the system. After 
translation of the codes, the data are subjected to a 
thorough quality control to identify technical deficien-
cies such as unmapped codes, deviations from usual 
patterns (e.g. in numbers of isolates or distribution of 
organisms), missing S/I/R interpretations or disk diam-
eters entered in a field defining MIC values. In addi-
tion, the data are checked for unexpected results such 
as exceptional phenotypes as defined by EUCAST [16] 
and resistance proportions deviating from those in his-
torical data from the MML. Finally, a list of HRMOs is 
compiled.
All findings resulting from the quality checks are, pref-
erably within two weeks, fed back to the MML for veri-
fication by the medical microbiologist and corrected 
if necessary. For HRMOs, information on confirmatory 
tests is requested if not available in the data provided. 
Only after verification by the medical microbiologist 
are the data finalised and used for analysis. Protection 
of personal information is ensured by collecting and 
storing only anonymised data and by thorough security 
Figure 3
Time trends for norfloxacin resistance in Escherichia coli, according to laboratory S/I/R interpretation versus re-
interpretation of raw testing values according to EUCAST (n = 21,382 samples) and usage of antimicrobial susceptibility 
testing standards (n = 18 laboratories), the Netherlands, 2008–2015
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management of the database in compliance with the 
baseline information security of the Dutch government.
To illustrate the data in the database of the Dutch 
national AMR surveillance system, characteristics of 
patients and isolates from 2016 are shown by speci-
men type in  Table 1. Most isolates (59% of 437,135 
isolates) were cultured from urine. Of those, 61% were 
collected in GP practices, mainly from women (67%), 
and  Escherichia coli  was most often isolated (53%). 
Blood isolates were predominantly cultured from 
hospitalised patients, and the most frequently isolated 
microorganisms were  E. coli  (20%) and coagulase-
negative  Staphylococcus  (40%). From the lower 
respiratory tract, mainly Haemophilus influenzae (26%) 
was cultured, whereas  Staphylococcus aureus  (35%) 
was the most common microorganism in wound and 
pus samples. Overall, most isolates (91%) originated 
from adults, especially those older than 65 years (54%).
Table 1
Characteristics of isolates from the Dutch national antimicrobial resistance surveillance database, 2016 (n = 437,135)
Blood Urine Lower respiratory tract
Wound 
 
pus a
Other sterile 
materials
n % n % n % n % n %
Number of isolates 25,074 100 257,515 100 35,556 100 61,874 100 57,116 100
Mean number of isolates per laboratory 643 NA 6,438 NA 889 NA 1,547 NA 1,428 NA
Pathogen
Escherichia coli 5,025 20 136,624 53 2,581 7 6,558 11 7,184 13
Klebsiella pneumoniae 925 4 19,520 8 1,277 4 1,411 2 1,346 2
Enterobacter cloacae 336 1 4,619 2 1,047 3 2,247 4 991 2
Proteus mirabilis 275 1 15,000 6 585 2 2,352 4 1,258 2
Other Enterobacteriaceae b 1128 4 21,126 8 3,665 10 5,614 9 5,088 9
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 437 2 7,861 3 3,576 10 3,820 6 4,307 8
Acinetobacter spp. 111 0 2,680 1 399 1 1,025 2 593 1
Haemophilus influenza 155 1 23 0 9,276 26 486 1 1,238 2
Other non-fermenting bacteria c 68 0 1,687 1 1,439 4 853 1 593 1
Enterococcus faecalis 692 3 20,771 8 83 0 2,988 5 1,033 2
Enterococcus faecium 587 2 2,562 1 102 0 1,515 2 413 1
Staphylococcus aureus 2,294 9 5,935 2 4,724 13 21,949 35 17,057 30
Coagulase-negative Staphylococcus 10,133 40 6,977 3 64 0 5,338 9 2,548 4
Streptococcus pneumoniae 1,577 6 52 0 3,562 10 422 1 575 1
Other Gram-positive bacteria d 1,318 5 12,076 5 498 1 5,141 8 12,620 22
Moraxella catarrhalis 13 0 2 0 2,678 8 155 0 272 0
Sex of patient
Male 13,932 56 84,702 33 20,440 57 33,251 54 23,244 41
Female 11,142 44 172,805 67 15,115 43 28,619 46 33,857 59
Age category of patient
0–4 years 1,138 5 8,350 3 587 2 2,228 4 5,019 9
5–18 years 352 1 13,264 5 813 2 2,316 4 5,350 9
19–64 years 7,627 30 84,616 33 12,291 35 26,751 43 31,115 54
> 65 years 15,957 64 151,285 59 21,865 61 30,579 49 15,632 27
Type of care
General practitioner 50 0 156,956 61 2,503 7 8,326 13 18,913 33
Outpatient departments 0 0 50,739 20 11,897 33 24,065 39 19,984 35
Inpatient departments (excl. intensive care units) 22,215 89 48,061 19 16,074 45 26,919 44 14,614 26
Intensive care units 2,809 11 1,759 1 5,082 14 2,564 4 3,605 6
NA: not applicable.
Only the first diagnostic isolate per patient was included.
a Including sterile tissues.
bMorganella spp., Citrobacter spp., Serratia spp., Providencia spp., Enterobacter spp., Proteus spp. (non-mirabilis), Klebsiella spp. 
(non-pneumoniae).
cPseudomonas spp. (non-aeruginosa), Stenotrophomonas spp.
dStreptococcus spp. (non-pneumoniae).
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Calculation of resistance levels 
Resistance levels are calculated as the proportion of 
all tested isolates of the same species that is resist-
ant (R) or non-susceptible (I + R) to the antimicrobial of 
interest. Before resistance trends are calculated, AST 
results are standardised. The importance of stand-
ardisation became clear when almost all laboratories 
adapted their testing standards to EUCAST guidelines 
[13] between 2011 and 2013. Although this did not have 
much impact on resistance levels and trends for most 
bug–drug combinations [17], a distortion of trends 
caused by large differences in breakpoints before and 
after the change of guideline was seen for some com-
binations. This is illustrated in  Figure 3, which shows 
a gradual increase in norfloxacin resistance in  E. 
coli that is entirely due to a gradual change in the AST 
breakpoint standards used. 
To avoid the presentation of such false time trends, 
crude test values, if available, have since 2012 been 
reinterpreted according to the latest EUCAST clini-
cal breakpoints. If re-interpretation is not possible, 
the isolate is excluded from the analysis. To date, re-
interpretation has been based only on MIC values from 
automated systems, microdilution or gradient tests 
because interpretation of zone diameters is heavily 
dependent on the disk diffusion method used, owing to 
differences in medium, inoculation density and amount 
of antibiotic in the disk. Therefore, for microorganisms 
mainly tested by disk diffusion, or if otherwise less 
than 80% of results can be re-interpreted, only cross-
sectional resistance levels are calculated, based on 
the S/I/R interpretation from MMLs that used EUCAST 
AST guidelines during the whole analysed period.
To avoid overestimation of resistance caused by multi-
ple counting [18,19], one isolate per patient is included. 
Depending on the objectives of the analysis, this may 
be the first, the last or the most resistant isolate per 
patient, per species, per calendar year or per esti-
mated episode of infection [20]. If necessary, this 
selection can be further specified by specimen, health-
care setting and hospital ward. However, because we 
only have unique patient identifiers per institution, 
patients transferring between hospitals are counted 
multiple times. The extent of multiple counting in our 
database is unclear. To solve this issue, a countrywide 
unique patient identifier is necessary, for example an 
encrypted, and therefore anonymised, citizen service 
number. However, this involves privacy and data secu-
rity issues that have not been solved yet.
To avoid overestimation of resistance caused by active 
screening for resistance, only data on diagnostic cul-
tures are included for most research questions [19,20]. 
To minimise overestimation of resistance caused by 
second level susceptibility testing or selective testing 
[19,20], analyses on antimicrobial susceptibility are 
conducted on data from only those MMLs that tested 
susceptibility to the antimicrobial agent of interest in 
at least 50% of isolates of the species in question.
A remaining challenge is how to adjust for the influence 
of changes in sampling practices on the calculated 
level of resistance. Because resistance levels are cal-
culated as the proportion of resistant among the total 
number of tested isolates, selective sampling, in which 
patients with resistant microorganisms are more likely 
to be sampled, increases the observed resistance pro-
portions [21]. In Dutch hospitals, specimens for micro-
biological cultures are usually sampled whenever there 
is a clinical suspicion of an infection, especially sus-
pected blood stream infection. However, because of 
the restrictive sampling policy in Dutch GP practices 
and nursing homes, the percentage of resistant iso-
lates in these settings is expected to be overestimated. 
If not interpreted with caution, this may influence deci-
sions on empiric therapy towards an unnecessarily 
increased use of second-line antibiotics.
 Output and utilisation of the data 
Results from the national AMR surveillance system are 
published in several ways. Firstly, resistance propor-
tions and temporal trends are described for a selection 
of clinically relevant bacterial pathogens in the annual 
report on consumption of antimicrobials and antimi-
crobial resistance in the Netherlands [22]. Secondly, 
resistance figures are provided by the RIVM on request 
or can be obtained through interactive reports on the 
web interface (www.ISISweb.nl). This interactive web-
site facilitates generation of AMR reports for different 
specimen types, patient groups, and hospital wards. 
On the publicly available part of the website, only 
nationally aggregated data can be generated, whereas 
the password-protected part allows representatives of 
participating MMLs to generate reports for their own 
Table 2
Resistance levels for colistin in Escherichia coli and 
Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates from the national 
antimicrobial resistance surveillance database, the 
Netherlands, 2011–2015 (n = 132,116)
Year Number of tested isolates
Colistin-resistant isolates
n % 95% CI
Escherichia coli
2011 19,651 71 0.4 0.3–0.4
2012 25,724 119 0.5 0.4–0.5
2013 24,882 104 0.4 0.3–0.5
2014 20,999 89 0.4 0.3–0.5
2015 20,589 105 0.5 0.4–0.6
Klebsiella pneumoniae
2011 3,727 45 1.2 0.9–1.6
2012 4,485 43 1.0 0.7–1.2
2013 4,267 61 1.4 1.1–1.8
2014 3,813 39 1.0 0.7–1.3
2015 3,979 45 1.1 0.8–1.5
CI: confidence interval.
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institution. The reports are benchmarked with nation-
ally aggregated data from all hospitals and from hos-
pitals of the same type as the local hospital, which is 
possible because of the uniformly standardised codes 
in the surveillance system. In addition, the protected 
part of the website generates standard reports every 
3 months for each individual hospital, again bench-
marked against national figures. Finally, a subset of 
the surveillance data is sent annually to the European 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-
Net) which is coordinated by the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control [23].
The information provided by the national AMR surveil-
lance system is used in medical practice and public 
health in several ways. Firstly, resistance figures are 
used as a rational base for empiric therapy, for devel-
opment of national and local antibiotic treatment 
guidelines and for antibiotic stewardship programmes. 
One example is the development of the empiric treat-
ment guideline for general practitioners on otitis 
media in children [24], which used national resistance 
data provided following a request from the College of 
General Practitioners who developed that guideline. 
At the national level, the surveillance data help cre-
ate awareness of antibiotic resistance and advocate 
prudent antimicrobial use, for example through the 
website  www.volksgezondheidenzorg.info/onderwerp/
antimicrobiële-resistentie-amr. Furthermore, data from 
the surveillance system help interpret the potential 
impact of new resistance mechanisms. For example, 
with regard to the discovery of the  mcr-1  resistance 
mechanism for colistin in Enterobacteriaceae [25], sur-
veillance data showed that phenotypic resistance lev-
els for colistin in E. coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae had 
remained stable during the past 5 years (Table 2). 
Although it is not possible to analyse trends in the 
distribution of the gene because only phenotypic data 
are collected, data from the national AMR surveillance 
system can be used to select relevant isolates for addi-
tional testing.
The national AMR surveillance system provides oppor-
tunities for in-depth scientific research that generates 
additional knowledge on AMR. Examples of research 
based on Dutch national surveillance data are studies 
on the impact the EUCAST breakpoint implementation 
in Dutch MMLs had on resistance levels in surveil-
lance data [17,26], a review on the adequacy of the 
urinary tract infection treatment guideline in hospital-
ised patients [27], a trend analysis for AMR in hospi-
tals where SDD/SOD is applied vs hospitals where this 
is not the case [28,29], trends in the proportion of  E. 
coliand  K. pneumoniae  with an ESBL-producing gene 
[30], and detection and epidemiology of carbapene-
mase-producing Enterobacteriaceae in the Netherlands 
[31].
As an additional effect of national surveillance, par-
ticipation of the MMLs in the national AMR surveil-
lance network has contributed to sharing of knowledge 
and quality improvement. Triggered by the feed-
back on the monthly file, many MMLs perform more 
confirmatory tests for potential HRMOs and excep-
tional phenotypes such as carbapenem resistance in 
Enterobacteriaceae or vancomycin non-susceptibility 
in methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA). Furthermore, 
quality control by the national surveillance team has 
revealed methodological issues with regard to AST. For 
example, in data from laboratories using the VITEK2 
test panel P608, it was not possible to differentiate 
between rifampicin-susceptible and -intermediate  S. 
aureus  isolates according to EUCAST breakpoints 
because the lowest concentration in the test panel was 
at the R breakpoint of ≤ 0.5. In the new test panel P633, 
the concentration range is adapted.
Finally, the national surveillance network provides a 
platform for further harmonisation of AST methods in 
participating MMLs, which benefits the comparability 
of local data with nationwide data. One of the initia-
tives that were supported by the national surveillance 
network was the development of a guideline on a uni-
form test panel for disk diffusion in microorganisms 
that cannot be tested with automated systems. This 
guideline is intended to harmonise the test panels 
between laboratories and consequently provide infor-
mation on resistance for both surveillance and clinical 
purposes.
Future developments and challenges 
To enhance quality and timeliness of data delivery to 
the national AMR surveillance system, the NVMM, RIVM 
and other stakeholders are working together to develop 
a new electronic messaging standard. This comprises 
a common data model, a new semantic standard [32] 
that is a subset of the existing international coding 
schemes SNOMED (www.ihtsdo.org/snomed-ct) and 
LOINC (www.loinc.org) as well as different HL7-based 
(www.hl7.org) data transfer messages. A number of 
MMLs, together with the RIVM, different LIMS vendors 
and other stakeholders, have started a pilot project 
that uses the new standards to generate and send data 
extractions to the database of the national surveillance 
system.
Data collection in the national AMR surveillance sys-
tem is currently limited to phenotypic susceptibil-
ity tests and some epidemiological information. To 
amplify the impact of the surveillance system on public 
health, healthcare and scientific research, opportuni-
ties are being explored to merge data from the national 
AMR surveillance system with existing data on type of 
infection, antibiotic use, co-morbidity and mortality at 
patient level and/or genotypic data. This will require 
standardised, encrypted patient and sample identifi-
ers in each system, but once established, it will allow 
insight into the risk factors, spread and burden of AMR.
Another envisioned development is the design of an 
algorithm for the detection of (multi-institutional) 
outbreaks of HRMOs. In the Netherlands, hospitals 
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usually have a well-functioning infection prevention 
policy in which detection of local outbreaks is incor-
porated. Nevertheless, individual laboratories do not 
have access to data from neighbouring laboratories 
and analysis of data from the national AMR surveil-
lance system can serve as a safety net to detect local 
or multi-institutional outbreaks. We used SaTScan 
software (www.SaTScan.org) to develop an algorithm 
to detect clusters of resistant microorganisms in space 
and time, but many of these clusters were found not to 
be clonal upon validation (data not shown). Currently, 
a new approach is being developed to detect clusters 
of resistant microorganisms, possibly in combination 
with other datasets.
A remaining challenge is to develop a method to ade-
quately distinguish between healthcare-associated 
and community-acquired infections. Currently, it is not 
possible to identify which patients are transferred from 
one hospital to another because the national AMR sur-
veillance system does not use a countrywide unique 
patient identifier. This may lead to healthcare-asso-
ciated infections being misclassified as community-
acquired. Because the distinction between these types 
of infection is increasingly important in the context of 
antibiotic stewardship, it is desirable to have insight 
into healthcare transfers by using countrywide unique 
patient identifiers, which is currently not available for 
our system.
Conclusion 
Since 2008, the Dutch national AMR surveillance sys-
tem has developed into a successful tool for the sur-
veillance and control of AMR in the Netherlands. This 
was possible because of the successful collaboration 
between the surveillance team and the medical micro-
biologists from the MMLs, and because of investment 
in epidemiological knowledge.
The system provides background information for policy 
making in public health and healthcare, it supports the 
development of empiric antibiotic therapy guidelines 
and facilitates in-depth research. In addition, partici-
pation of the MMLs in the national AMR surveillance 
network has contributed to sharing of knowledge and 
quality improvement.
A future improvement to the system will be the imple-
mentation of a new semantic standard with standard-
ised data transfer, which will reduce errors in data 
handling and enable more real-time surveillance. 
Furthermore, the impact of the system may be ampli-
fied by a possibility to merge with databases con-
taining clinical patient data and genotypic data on 
microorganisms, and by development of a validated 
cluster detection system for institutional and multi-
institutional outbreaks.
Members of National AMR Surveillance Study Group
J.W.T. Cohen-Stuart, Department of Microbiology, Noordwest 
Ziekenhuisgroep, Alkmaar.
A.J.L. Weersink, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Meander Medical Centre, Amersfoort.
C.E. Visser, Department of Medical Microbiology, Academic 
Medical Center, Amsterdam.
C.M.J.E. Vandenbroucke-Grauls, Department of Medical 
Microbiology and Infection Control, VU University medical 
center Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
M.L. van Ogtrop, Department of Medical Microbiology, Onze 
Lieve Vrouwe Gasthuis, Amsterdam.
D.J. Soeltan-Kaersenhout, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, Slotervaart Hospital / Netherlands Cancer 
Institute, Amsterdam.
M. Scholing, Public Health Laboratory, Public Health Service 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
B.C. van Hees, Department of Medical Microbiology and 
Infection prevention, Gelre Hospitals, Apeldoorn.
P.H.J. van Keulen, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Bravis Hospital, Bergen op Zoom.
J. Alblas, W. Altorf-van der Kuil, L. Blijboom, F.N.J. Frakking, 
S.C. de Greeff, S. Groenendijk, J. van Heereveld, R. Hertroys, 
J.C. Monen, D.W. Notermans, A.F. Schoffelen, M.I. van 
Triest, A.L.M. Vlek, C.C.H. Wielders, S.H.S. Woudt, Centre 
for Infectious Diseases, Epidemiology and Surveillance. 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM), Bilthoven.
P.H.J. van Keulen, J.A.J.W. Kluytmans, Laboratory for 
Microbiology and Infection Control, Amphia Hospital, Breda.
E.M. Kraan, Department of Medical Microbiology, IJsselland 
hospital, Capelle a/d Ijssel.
E.E. Lundblad-Mattsson, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, Reinier de Graaf Groep, Delft.
F.W. Sebens, Department of Medical Microbiology, Deventer 
Hospital, Deventer.
E. de Jong, Department of Medical Microbiology, Slingeland 
Hospital, Doetinchem.
H.M.E. Frénay, B. Maraha, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, Albert Schweitzer Hospital, Dordrecht.
A.J. van Griethuysen, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Gelderse Vallei Hospital, Ede.
W. Silvis, Laboratory of Medical Microbiology and Public 
Health, Enschede
A. Demeulemeester, SHL-Groep, Etten-Leur.
B.B. Wintermans, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Admiraal De Ruyter Hospital, Goes.
M.J.C.A. van Trijp, Groene Hart Ziekenhuis Gouda, Gouda.
M.G.R. Hendrix, A. Ott, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Certe, Groningen.
J.P. Arends, G.A. Kampinga, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, University of Groningen, Groningen.
9www.eurosurveillance.org
D. Veenendaal, Regional Laboratory of Public Health, 
Haarlem.
A.J.L. Weersink, Department of Medical Microbiology, St 
Jansdal Hospital, Harderwijk.
E.I.G.B. de Brauwer, F.S. Stals, Department of Medical 
Microbiology and Infection Control, Zuyderland Medical 
Centre Heerlen, Heerlen.
L.J. Bakker, J.W. Dorigo-Zetsma, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, CBSL, Tergooi Hospital, Hilversum.
B. Ridwan, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Westfriesgasthuis, Hoorn.
J.H. van Zeijl, Izore, Centre for Infectious Diseases Friesland, 
Leeuwarden.
A.T. Bernards, Department of Medical Microbiology, Leiden 
University Medical Center, Leiden.
S. Erkens-Hulshof, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Maastricht University Medical Centre, Maastricht.
B.M. de Jongh, Department of Medical Microbiology and 
Immunology, St Antonius Hospital, Nieuwegein.
M.H. Nabuurs-Franssen, Department of Medical Microbiology 
and Infectious Diseases, Canisius Wilhelmina Hospital, 
Nijmegen.
S. Kuipers, Department of Medical Microbiology, Radboud 
University Nijmegen Medical Center, Nijmegen.
B.M.W. Diederen, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Bravis Hospital, Roosendaal.
D.C. Melles, Department of Medical Microbiology, Erasmus 
University Medical Center, Rotterdam.
M. van Rijn, Department of Medical Microbiology, Ikazia 
Hospital, Rotterdam.P. de Man, Department of Medical 
Microbiology, Sint Franciscus Gasthuis, Rotterdam.
D.C. Melles, STAR Medical Diagnostic Center Rotterdam, 
Rotterdam.
N. Vaessen, Department of Medical Microbiology, Franciscus 
Vlietland Hospital, Schiedam.
M.A. Leverstein - van Hall, Department of Medical 
Microbiology and Infection Control, Alrijne Hospital, Leiden/ 
HMC, The Hague.
E.P.M. van Elzakker, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
Haga Teaching Hospital, The Hague.
A.E. Muller, Department of Medical Microbiology, MCH 
Westeinde Hospital, The Hague.
N.H. Renders, Department of Medical Microbiology and 
Infection Control, Jeroen Bosch Hospital, ‘s-Hertogenbosch.
D.W. van Dam, Department of Medical Microbiology and 
Infection Control, Zuyderland Medical Centre, Sittard-Geleen.
B.G.A. Hendrickx, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
ZorgSaam Hospital Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, Terneuzen.
A.G.M. Buiting, Department of Medical Microbiology, St. 
Elisabeth Hospital, Tilburg.
M.P.D. Deege, Department of Medical Microbiology, Saltro 
Diagnostic Centre, Utrecht.
F.N.J. Frakking, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
University Medical Centre Utrecht, Utrecht.
A.L.M. Vlek, Department of Medical Microbiology and 
Immunology, Diakonessenhuis, Utrecht.
I.T.M.A. Overdevest, Department of Medical Microbiology, 
PAMM, Veldhoven.
R.W. Bosboom, Laboratory for Medical Microbiology and 
Immunology, Rijnstate Hospital, Velp.
T.A.M. Trienekens, VieCuri Medical Center Venlo, Venlo.
G.P. Voorn, Department of Medical Microbiology, Zuwe 
Hofpoort Hospital, Woerden.
G.J.H.M. Ruijs, M.J.H.M. Wolfhagen, Laboratory of Medical 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Isala, Zwolle.
Acknowledgements
We would like to take this opportunity to thank the people 
who have been involved in the national AMR surveillance sys-
tem, currently and in the past; in particular N. van de Sande-
Bruinsma, R.A. Coutinho, G. Haringhuizen, M. A. Leverstein 
van Hall, J. Monen, J. Muijlwijk, and G.J.H.M. Ruijs. We would 
also like to thank all the participating MMLs.
The national AMR surveillance system is supported by the 
Dutch Ministry of Health.
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Authors’ contributions
Wieke Altorf – van der Kuil performed the analyses of the 
data and wrote the paper. Wieke Altorf – van der Kuil, Annelot 
F. Schoffelen, Sabine C. de Greeff, H. Jeroen Alblas, Anne 
L.M. Vlek, Tjalling Leenstra and the members of the National 
AMR Surveillance Study Group approved the design of the 
system, are collecting and recording the data in the national 
surveillance system for antimicrobial resistance, and provide 
local interpretation and analysis of the acquired data. Steven 
F.T. Thijsen, Daan W. Notermans, and Marianne A.B. van der 
Sande are involved in the Dutch national surveillance sys-
tem as advisors. All authors, including the members of the 
National AMR Surveillance Study Group reviewed the paper 
critically, and comments and suggestions were incorporated 
in the final version by Wieke Altorf – van der Kuil.
References
1. World Health Organisation (WHO). Antimicrobial resistance: 
global report on surveillance 2014. Geneva: WHO; 2014. 
Available from: http://www.who.int/drugresistance/
documents/surveillancereport/en/
2. World Health Organisation (WHO). World health day 2011. 
Geneva: WHO; 2011. Available from: http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2011/whd_20110407/en/
3. World Health Organisation (WHO). Antimicrobial resistance 
in the European Union and the world. Geneva: WHO; 2012. 
Available from: http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2012/
amr_20120314/en/
4. Science and Technology Committee. Wednesday 23 January 
2013 Meeting started at 10.12am, ended 11.11am. London: UK 
10 www.eurosurveillance.org
parliament; 2013. Available from: http://parliamentlive.tv/
event/index/c7df492a-f492-4953-a9bf-2cba88857c82
5. O’Neill J. Tackling drug-resistant infections globally: final 
report and recommendations. Review of antimicrobial 
resistance. London: HM Government and Wellcome trust; 
2016. Available from: https://amr-review.org/sites/default/
files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf
6. World Health Organisation (WHO). Global action plan on 
antimicrobial resistance. Geneva: WHO; 2015. Available from: 
http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/publications/
global-action-plan/en/
7. World Health Organisation Regional Office for Europe (WHO/
Europe). Central Asian and Eastern European Surveillance on 
Antimicrobial Resistance (CAESAR). Copenhagen: WHO/Europe. 
[Accessed: October 2016]. Available from: http://www.euro.
who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/antimicrobial-
resistance/about-amr/central-asian-and-eastern-european-
surveillance-of-antimicrobial-resistance-caesar
8. World Health Organisation (WHO). Global Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS). Geneva: WHO. 
[Accessed: October 2016]. Available from: http://www.who.
int/antimicrobial-resistance/global-action-plan/surveillance/
glass/en/
9. Leverstein-van Hall MA, van de Sande-Bruinsma N. (ISIS-AR: A 
new system for surveillance of antimicrobial resistance). ISIS-
AR: een nieuw systeem voor surveillance van antimicrobiële 
resistentie. Ned Tijdschr Med Microbiol.2008;16(3):10-6.
10. van de Sande-Bruinsma N, Thijsen S, Leverstein-van Hall 
MA. (Surveillance of antibiotic resistance in the Netherlands: 
ISIS-AR and ISISweb). Antibioticaresistentiesurveillance 
in Nederland: ISIS-AR en ISISweb. Ned Tijdschr Med 
Microbiol.2010;18(4):10-8.
11. Leenstra T, Thijssen SFT, Van der Bij AK. (ISIS-AR – 
insight in 7 years local and national trends in antibiotic 
resistance). ISIS-AR - inzicht in 7 jaar lokale en 
nationale antibioticaresistentietrends. Ned Tijdschr Med 
Microbiol.2015;23(1):22-8.
12. Werkgroep Infectie Preventie (WIP). WIP richtlijn voor 
maatregelen tegen overdracht van bijzonder resistente 
micro-organismen (BRMO) in ziekenhuizen. [WIP guideline 
on measures against transmission of highly resistant micro-
organisms in hospitals]. Bilthoven: National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (RIVM); 2011. Dutch. Available 
from: http://www.rivm.nl/Documenten_en_publicaties/
Professioneel_Praktisch/Richtlijnen/Infectieziekten/
WIP_Richtlijnen/WIP_Richtlijnen/Ziekenhuizen/WIP_richtlijn_
BRMO_Bijzonder_Resistente_Micro_Organismen_ZKH
13. European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
(EUCAST). Antimicrobial susceptibility testing. Växjö: EUCAST. 
[Accessed: October 2016]. Available from: http://www.eucast.
org/ast_of_bacteria/
14. Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI). Performance 
standards for antimicrobial susceptibility testing. Wayne: CLSI. 
[Accessed: Oct 2016]. Newest version available from: https://
clsi.org/standards/products/microbiology/documents/m100/
15. Netherlands Society of Medical Microbiologists (NVMM). 
NVMM Guideline. Laboratory detection of highly resistant 
microorganisms (HRMO). Version 1.0. Leeuwarden: NVMM; 
2016. Available from: http://www.nvmm.nl/media/1051/2012_
hrmo_mrsa_esbl.pdf
16. Leclercq R, Cantón R, Brown DF, Giske CG, Heisig P, MacGowan 
AP, et al. EUCAST expert rules in antimicrobial susceptibility 
testing. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2013;19(2):141-60.  https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1469-0691.2011.03703.x 
17. van der Bij AK, van Dijk K, Muilwijk J, Thijsen SF, Notermans 
DW, de Greeff S, et al. Clinical breakpoint changes and 
their impact on surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in 
Escherichia coli causing bacteraemia. Clin Microbiol Infect. 
2012;18(11):E466-72. http://dx.doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1469-0691.2012.03996.x PMID:22925456http://dx.doi.org/ 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-0691.2012.03996.x 
18. Shannon KP, French GL. Antibiotic resistance: effect of 
different criteria for classifying isolates as duplicates on 
apparent resistance frequencies. J Antimicrob Chemother. 
2002;49(1):201-4.  https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/49.1.201 
19. Rempel OR, Laupland KB. Surveillance for antimicrobial 
resistant organisms: potential sources and magnitude of 
bias. Epidemiol Infect. 2009;137(12):1665-73.  https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0950268809990100 
20. Cornaglia G, Hryniewicz W, Jarlier V, Kahlmeter G, 
Mittermayer H, Stratchounski L, et al. European 
recommendations for antimicrobial resistance surveillance. 
Clin Microbiol Infect. 2004;10(4):349-83.  https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1198-743X.2004.00887.x 
21. Schwaber MJ, De-Medina T, Carmeli Y. Epidemiological 
interpretation of antibiotic resistance studies - what are we 
missing? Nat Rev Microbiol. 2004;2(12):979-83.  https://doi.
org/10.1038/nrmicro1047 
22. de Greeff SC, Mouton JW, Schoffelen AF. NethMap 2017: 
consumption of antimicrobial agents and antimicrobial 
resistance among medically important bacteria in the 
Netherlands/MARAN 2017: Monitoring of antimicrobial 
resistance and antibiotic usage in animals in the Netherlands 
in 2016. Bilthoven: National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment (RIVM); 2016. Available from: http://www.
rivm.nl/Documenten_en_publicaties/Wetenschappelijk/
Rapporten/2017/Juni/NethMap_2017_Consumption_of_
antimicrobial_agents_and_antimicrobial_resistance_
among_medically_important_bacteria_in_the_Netherlands_
MARAN_2017_Monitoring_of_antimicrobial_resistance_and_
antibiotic_usage_in_animals_in_the_Netherlands_in_2016
23. European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network 
(EARS-Net). Stockholm: European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC). [Accessed: October 2016]. 
Available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/
surveillance/EARS-Net/Pages/index.aspx
24. Damoiseaux RAMJ, Venekamp RP, Eekhof JAH, Bennebroek 
Gravenhorst FM, Schoch AG, Burgers JS, et al. (The Dutch 
College of General Practitioners’ guideline on the treatment of 
Otitis media acuta in children). NHG-Standaard Otitis media 
acuta bij kinderen. Huisarts Wet. 2014;57(12):648.
25. Liu YY, Wang Y, Walsh TR, Yi LX, Zhang R, Spencer J, et 
al. Emergence of plasmid-mediated colistin resistance 
mechanism MCR-1 in animals and human beings in China: 
a microbiological and molecular biological study. Lancet 
Infect Dis. 2016;16(2):161-8.  https://doi.org/10.1016/
S1473-3099(15)00424-7 
26. Leverstein-van Hall MA, Waar K, Muilwijk J, Cohen Stuart J, 
Sabbe LJM, Frenay HME, et al. Consequences of switching from 
a fixed 2 : 1 ratio of amoxicillin/clavulanate (CLSI) to a fixed 
concentration of clavulanate (EUCAST) for susceptibility testing 
of Escherichia coli. J Antimicrob Chemother. 2013;68(11):2636-
40.  https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/dkt218 
27. Koningstein M, van der Bij AK, de Kraker MEA, Monen JC, 
Muilwijk J, de Greeff SC, et al. Recommendations for the 
empirical treatment of complicated urinary tract infections 
using surveillance data on antimicrobial resistance in the 
Netherlands. PLoS One. 2014;9(1):e86634.  https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0086634 
28. Houben AJM, Oostdijk EAN, van der Voort PHJ, Monen JCM, 
Bonten MJM, van der Bij AK, et al. Selective decontamination 
of the oropharynx and the digestive tract, and antimicrobial 
resistance: a 4 year ecological study in 38 intensive care units 
in the Netherlands. J Antimicrob Chemother. 2014;69(3):797-
804.  https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/dkt416 
29. van der Bij AK, Frentz D, Bonten MJISIS-AR Study Group. 
Gram-positive cocci in Dutch ICUs with and without selective 
decontamination of the oropharyngeal and digestive tract: 
a retrospective database analysis. J Antimicrob Chemother. 
2016;71(3):816-20.  https://doi.org/10.1093/jac/dkv396 
30. van der Steen M, Leenstra T, Kluytmans JAJW, van der Bij 
AKISIS-AR study group. Trends in expanded-spectrum 
cephalosporin-resistant Escherichia coli and Klebsiella 
pneumoniae among Dutch clinical isolates, from 2008 to 2012. 
PLoS One. 2015;10(9):e0138088.  https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0138088 
31. Vlek AL, Frentz D, Haenen A, Bootsma HJ, Notermans 
DW, Frakking FN, et al. Detection and epidemiology of 
carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae in the 
Netherlands in 2013-2014. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect 
Dis. 2016;35(7):1089-96.  https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10096-016-2636-6 
32. Feikje Hielkema-Raadsveld. Hoe plukt u de vruchten 
van LOINC, SNOMED CT en UCUM? [How can you 
enjoy the benefits of LOINC, SNOMED CT and 
UCUM?]. Den Haag: NICTIZ; 2016. Dutch. Available 
from:https://www.nictiz.nl/publicaties/whitepapers/
hoe-plukt-u-de-vruchten-van-loinc-snomed-ct-en-ucum
License and copyright
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of 
the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) Licence. You 
may share and adapt the material, but must give appropriate 
credit to the source, provide a link to the licence, and indi-
cate if changes were made.
This article is copyright of the authors, 2017.
